Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV BUD

The business

AB InBev brews and distributes about 500 beer brands across roughly 50 countries, with Budweiser, Corona, Stella Artois, and Michelob Ultra anchoring the global megabrands and a long tail of national champions (Modelo in Mexico, Brahma and Skol in Brazil, Jupiler in Belgium, Harbin in China, Cass in Korea, Aguila in Colombia, Castle in South Africa). The 20% of the business doing 80% of the work right now is the global megabrand portfolio plus the Latin American volume engine: Middle Americas (Mexico, Colombia) and South America (Brazil, Argentina) together generate roughly 45% of revenue and an outsized share of EBITDA at the highest segment margins in the company, while North America contributes about 25% of revenue but punches below its weight on profit since the Bud Light episode. EMEA and Asia Pacific round out the rest. Premium and super-premium brands now drive over a third of revenue and a larger share of profit growth, and the no-alcohol / beyond-beer category (Corona Cero, Michelob Ultra Zero, Cutwater) is the fastest-growing slice off a small base.

The qualitative fact the financials don't show: AB InBev runs a leverage-deleverage cycle, not a steady-state balance sheet. The 2016 SABMiller deal piled on debt that peaked above 5× EBITDA; the playbook since has been disciplined paydown, asset sales (Australian Carlton & United, the Anadolu Efes JV restructuring), and patient deleveraging while the underlying franchise compounds at low-single-digit organic revenue growth and mid-single-digit EBITDA. Net debt / EBITDA is now about 2.9×, the lowest since the SABMiller close, and the board has finally restarted a meaningful buyback ($2B announced in 2024, extended in 2025). Bud Light's US market share collapsed from about 10% to 6% in 2023 and has stabilized at the lower base; the franchise didn't break but the North American profit pool reset, and the recovery is grinding rather than snapping back.