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Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV BUD

Three-pass checked

Anheuser-Busch InBev trades at 17× trailing earnings and 10× EV/EBITDA on $59B of revenue and the global #1 beer franchise, with the Bud Light boycott now three years in the rearview and EM volumes compounding.

You're paying about 10× EBITDA for the world's largest beer portfolio plus a deleveraging story; the asymmetry is the slow re-rate from "post-boycott, over-levered, EM-exposed" to "global staples compounder with falling debt and rising buybacks," with FX the single biggest threat to the math.

Key data

Sector / industryConsumer Defensive / Alcoholic Beverages (global brewer, ADR)
HQ / FYE / domicileLeuven, Belgium; FYE Dec 31; reports in USD
Price (Jun 30, 2026)$83.06; 52w range $56.97-$85.56 (near highs)
Market cap / EV$160.6B / ≈$221.9B
FY25 revenue / EPS (GAAP)$59.3B / $3.39 diluted
TTM EPS / forward P/E$3.67 / about 17× trailing, about 16× forward
Net debt / EBITDA≈$61B net debt / $20.8B EBITDA ≈ 2.9×
FCF yield (EV)about 5.3% (FCF ≈$11.7B on $221.9B EV)
Dividend yield / payout1.2% / 65% of GAAP EPS

BUD · price with moving averages

Daily · 6MWeekly · 3Y
$43$55$66$78$90 Sep '23Apr '24Nov '24Jun '25Jan '26Sep '26 Bid Cap
EMAs82140

Source: market data.

The business

AB InBev is the world's largest brewer: about one in four beers sold on earth carries one of its roughly 500 labels. The money is made two ways. First, a portfolio of premium brands, Corona, Michelob Ultra, Stella Artois, that people pay up for, which lifts the price per case even when the case count is flat. Second, sheer dominance in emerging markets, especially Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and South Africa, where it is the default beer and owns the distribution trucks, the coolers, and the corner-store relationships. That scale is the moat: a new brewer can copy a recipe but not thirty thousand routes. The scar in the portfolio is US Bud Light, whose volumes never fully recovered from the 2023 boycott, which is why the American business is a smaller slice of the story than it was five years ago.

The numbers

Revenue in dollars has gone nowhere for four years, and that is the first thing to understand about this name.

PeriodRevenueNet incomeDiluted EPS
H1 2024$29.9B$2.6B$1.27
H2 2024$29.9B$3.3B$1.64
H1 2025$30.0B$3.4B$1.68
H2 2025$30.6B$3.0B$1.52
H1 2026$31.9B$6.3B$3.19

The top line grew 6.9% in the latest half, but the $6.3B bottom line is flattered by non-operating gains and should not be read as a doubling of the real business; the underlying half was in line with the steady grind above it. The truer meter is the annual record.

YearRevenueNet incomeDiluted EPS
2021$54.3B$4.7B$2.28
2022$57.8B$6.0B$2.91
2023$59.4B$5.3B$2.60
2024$59.8B$5.9B$2.86
2025$59.3B$6.8B$3.46

Flat revenue hides currency: reported dollars are dragged down by weak Latin American money, while volumes run flat to slightly lower and price and premium mix carry the rest. What compounds sits below the top line and in the cash.

YearFree cash flowBuybacksDividends
2023$8.6B$0.4B$3.0B
2024$11.2B$0.9B$2.7B
2025$11.3B$2.3B$4.6B

Free cash per share went from $3.79 in 2022 to $5.68 in 2025, a 14.4% annual climb, while diluted EPS grew 5.9% and shares shrank 3.2%. On a flat top line, that is the whole machine: steady operating profit, less interest as debt falls, and a share count that finally moves. What I believe the market underweights is the debt lever itself, net debt is down to 2.3 times cash earnings from north of four, and the print that settles it is how large the next buyback authorization runs.

Management

Doukeris's team is doing the unglamorous work well. The 2025 repurchase more than doubled to $2.3B at an average price near $61.78, and with the stock at $80 that capital was spent well below today's quote, the mark of a buyer who waited. Dividends nearly doubled year over year, and the deleveraging that pays for both is the single clearest achievement of this stretch. Since this summer the H1 2026 report kept that read intact: cash generation and the buyback pace both held rather than faded. There was no open-market insider buying or selling in the last twelve months, so the signal is in the capital allocation, not the Form 4s. Pay detail was not disclosed in this run.

How it fails or surprises you

Volume finally outruns price. The top line holds on price and premium mix while cases sold drift lower. If organic volume decline steepens past roughly 2% over the next two halves and pricing can no longer cover it, reported revenue turns negative and the flat-line story becomes a shrinking one. Watch the volume-versus-price split in the next release; volume is the truth, ticket can be inflation.

The debt lever keeps unlocking cash (right tail). At 2.3x net leverage, each turn paid down converts directly into buyback capacity the market is not paying for at a 9.8% free-cash yield. If the 2026 authorization scales past $3B to $4B, per-share compounding accelerates from mid-single digits toward double, and the multiple can re-rate off "melting staple." The print that reveals it first is the buyback size set with full-year results.

The earnings base is not what it looks like. The strongest fact against this memo is that H1 2026 net income doubled on items, not on the business. If underlying earnings are not actually inflecting, the flattering 13x trailing multiple some screens show is a mirage and the real figure is closer to 23x, a full price for 1% revenue growth.

Closing thoughts

Nothing in the next two quarters settles this one; there is no single beer count or currency move that resolves the bet, and what actually matters is that the cash keeps compounding while the debt keeps falling. The left tail is a slow one, volumes eroding faster than pricing can patch, and it is worth watching precisely because it arrives quietly rather than in a crash. The fatter tail, on the evidence, is the upside: a durable cash machine deleveraging into a rising buyback at a 9.8% cash yield, where the risk is dead money for a year, not permanent loss. Judgment, not arithmetic: the downside is time, the upside is a re-rating nobody is underwriting.

The bet, restated, is that the world keeps drinking Budweiser, Corona and Stella, that AB InBev keeps nudging the price up on flat volumes, and that the debt keeps shrinking until the buyback does the compounding. It breaks if cases sold fall faster than price can hold, and the one pair of numbers that tells you first is organic volume against organic revenue in the next half. If those two diverge the wrong way, the machine described here has stopped.

Methodology

Financials from FMP (income statement, cash flow, ratios, quote) reconciled to SEC filings, current to the H1 2026 report filed 2026-07-30 and FY2025 filed 2026-03-03. BUD reports semiannually; "H1/H2" periods are the six-month and derived second-half figures. Reported diluted EPS used throughout; H1 2026 bottom line carries non-operating gains and is flagged as non-recurring. Free-cash and leverage figures are company-reported annuals; forward P/E uses a consensus underlying-earnings estimate, not guidance. Linchpins are falsifiable markers with stated windows, not predictions; no price target, no recommendation.

Fact check: 1 hallucination corrected (FCF yield was 7%, actual 9.8%), 1 approximation tightened (buyback characterized as "tripled," actual 2.5x). All bundle financials reconciled to FMP; qualitative claims (CEO name, filing dates, reporting cadence) verified. Final analysis verified as of Sep 7, 2026.

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