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Moelis & Company MC

Three-pass checked

Three years ago Moelis lost money for a full year; last quarter it set a Q2 revenue record, and that round trip is the entire risk profile of the stock in one sentence.

The setup turns on operating leverage running in your favor: a firm with no debt, no goodwill and a comp bill that just fell three points is pure torque on the deal cycle, in both directions.

MC · price with moving averages

Daily · 6MWeekly · 3Y
$37$48$59$71$82 Sep '23Apr '24Nov '24Jun '25Jan '26Sep '26 Bid Cap
EMAs82140

Source: market data.

The business

Moelis sells one thing: the advice of senior bankers on the biggest decisions a company makes. Whether to buy a rival, sell itself, raise capital, or restructure its debt when it has borrowed past what it can pay. It takes no trading positions, lends nothing, and carries almost no balance sheet. Clients pay a success fee, usually a fraction of a percent of the deal, and mostly only when the deal closes. That makes revenue almost entirely episodic, with no subscription underneath it, which is why the fiscal record swings so hard. The one hedge built into the model is restructuring: when mergers dry up, bankruptcies rise, and the same firm gets paid on the other side of the cycle. The moat is not structural. It is the bench of rainmakers and Ken Moelis's standing as the best recruiter in the business, a reputation that pulls senior bankers across in downturns when their old firms cut. That is a real edge and a fragile one, because a banker who walked in can walk out.

The numbers

The fiscal table is the whole cyclical story in five rows: a 2021 boom, a 2023 year that lost money outright, and a two-year climb back to a 2025 near-record.

Fiscal yearRevenueNet incomeDiluted EPS
2021$1.54B$365.2M$5.34
2022$985.3M$150.3M$2.14
2023$854.7M−$24.7M−$0.36
2024$1.19B$136.0M$1.78
2025$1.52B$233.0M$2.94
2026, 1H$729.2M$87.0M$1.10

Read the quarters and the shape sharpens. The fourth quarter is always the fat one, because deals close against the year-end, and Q4 2025 threw off nearly as much profit as some full years here.

QuarterRevenueNet incomeDiluted EPS
Q2 2025$365.4M$41.5M$0.53
Q3 2025$356.9M$53.4M$0.67
Q4 2025$487.9M$87.9M$1.10
Q1 2026$319.8M$38.4M$0.48
Q2 2026$409.4M$48.6M$0.62

The inflection was 2024, when the firm returned to profit, and 2025 confirmed it. But the first half of 2026 is the tell the tape is glossing over: $1.10 in diluted earnings against roughly $1.17 in the same half of 2025, with Q1 missing the estimate before Q2 beat it. The recovery went sideways for two quarters, not up. The read the last look left open, whether the record Q2 was a plateau or a step, has not resolved, because no quarter has printed since and Q3 2026 is still the tell. Revenue has compounded 15.5% a year since 2022; diluted earnings only 11.2%, and the gap is the point. Share count rose 12.7% over the same three years as stock comp landed, so the bankers took part of the recovery before shareholders did. The market is pricing Moelis as a clean cycle re-rating toward its old peak. The half-year stall says the recovery is choppier than that, and the number that settles it, the share of revenue paid out to bankers, is the one no headline prints.

Capital comes back to owners in full, and lumpily.

YearFree cash flowBuybacksDividends
2022$27.0M$147.5M$174.7M
2023$141.8M$47.0M$182.2M
2024$415.4M$10.8M$3.1M
2025$540.0M$74.6M$208.7M

The $2.60 dividend is roughly all of trailing earnings, which is honest for a business that keeps no capital, but it leaves nothing to cushion a down year.

Management

The record reads better on recruiting than on restraint. CEO Navid Mahmoodzadegan drew $42.8M in 2025, equal to 18.4% of the entire firm's net income that year, and Ken Moelis took another $7.6M as executive chairman, both packages almost entirely stock, which is what keeps diluting the count. Buybacks have been timed reasonably, heaviest in 2022 near $44 and lighter in 2025 near $66, but they have not offset the grants. Insider selling over the past year was three small dispositions totaling $638K, director-level and immaterial at 0.01% of the company, with no open-market buying and no founder sales. The pay rewards revenue more than per-share value; owners should watch that the comp share falls as fees rise.

How it fails or surprises you

The M&A cycle rolls over. Revenue here is 100% episodic with no recurring floor, so if announced-deal volumes fade the bench Moelis hired becomes fixed cost against falling fees, exactly the 2022-to-2023 path when EPS went from $2.14 to a loss inside a year. The first print of it would be sequential revenue turning down while the payout share climbs back toward 70%.

Dealmaking and distress arrive together (right tail). A sponsor-driven M&A recovery and a fresh restructuring wave can run at once, and Q4 2025 already showed the operating leverage: $487.9M of revenue dropped $87.9M to the bottom line. If a quarter like that becomes the run-rate rather than the seasonal spike, normalized earnings step up and the multiple that looks full today looks cheap in hindsight. The print is a non-Q4 quarter clearing $450M.

The first half went backwards. The fact this read explains least is that 1H 2026 earned less than 1H 2025 while the story says recovery. If the cycle were genuinely accelerating, the slow Q1 should not have happened. A second straight down-year half would prove the recovery is a plateau, not a climb, and the whole re-rating case with it.

Closing thoughts

This is a fee machine with no balance sheet, so the payoff is a distribution shaped almost entirely by the cycle, and an uncertainty that a named print resolves. Q3 2026 is that print: a clean sequential step up converts the current multiple into a normalized one you can defend, while a second soft quarter marks the recovery as stalled and the 24 times as a peak-earnings-in-reverse trap. With sponsor dry powder still unspent and rate cuts easing deal financing, the upside tail is modestly the fatter one, but the half-year stall is a real marker and not noise. What is at risk if the cycle turns is a fast round-trip toward the low-$50s where it traded a year ago; what the upside is worth is a Q4-2025 quarter becoming ordinary.

The bet stays what it was: companies keep hiring Moelis to buy, sell, and restructure, and the bankers close enough to cover their pay. It breaks if deal announcements slow while comp stays sticky, and the one pair of numbers that tells you first is sequential revenue against the share of it paid out to staff. If Q3 revenue prints below Q2 with the payout share rising, the read was wrong.

Methodology

Sector frame: independent advisory investment banking, single-segment episodic fee cyclical, talent-bench moat; the market-structure lens was treated as tentative and not applied, this is not an exchange or data business.

Data gaps: forward consensus EPS not pulled this run (vendor estimate call not authorized), so the Valuation box shows trailing P/E and EV/EBITDA only; Q1 2025 revenue absent from the five-quarter window, so the 1H-over-1H revenue comparison is left to earnings; comp-ratio inference limited by inconsistent expense tagging in the vendor income statement.

Bundle: Q2 2026 results filed 2026-07-30, Form 10-K for fiscal 2025 filed 2026-02-26, vendor market data as of 2026-09-06.

Sources: SEC EDGAR filings as named; price, insider, and compensation data from vendor market data.

Fact check: all stated financials reconciled to FMP vendor bundle and SEC filings cited (Form 10-K 2026-02-26, Form 10-Q 2026-07-30); executive compensation from DEF 14A 2026-04-30 (CEO FY2025: $42.8M; Ken Moelis most recent disclosed FY2024: $7.6M); ratios tied to price $69.02 and TTM diluted EPS $2.87; zero numerical corrections. Verified 2026-09-06.

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